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RESUMO: este artigo propõe uma leitura intertextual entre a obra do poeta brasileiro Augusto dos Anjos e  
alguns  textos  selecionados  da  filosofia  existencialista  do  século  XX.  O  tema  da  dor  como  instância  
ontológica  de  manifestação  do  indivíduo  e  sua  repercussão  na  praxis  vital  decorrente  da  perspectiva  
fenomenológica-existencialista  aproxima  o  poeta  brasileiro  da  obra  de  Jean-Paul  Sartre.  A  noção  do  
absurdo em Dos Anjos consubstancia a ideia da miséria da condição humano frente ao outro e corrobora  
com a percepção sartreana do nada como auto-reflexividade da consciência.
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ABSTRACT: This article attempts at an intertextual reading of Brazilian poet Augusto dos Anjos together  
with selected texts of twentieth-century existential philosophy. The theme of pain as an ontological ground of  
individual  manifestation and its  conformity  with the vital  praxis  described  in  existential  phenomenology  
corroborates the possibilities of intertextuality among the works of Jean-Paul Sartre and dos Anjos. The  
notion of the misery of human condition face to face with the other brings both writers together under the  
concept of nothingness as the self-reflexivity of consciousness.
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Brazilian poet Augusto dos Anjos lived a very short life. He published only one 
book, and by the end of his days his frail health had won him the nickname of “tísico.” The 
word refers to a  sick person on the verge of dying.  It  is  usually applied to  patients  of 
turbeculosis. But dos Anjos never really showed any of the actual symptoms of the various 
forms of TB available to him in Brazil’s early twentieth century, or at least not until the 
very end of his life, when he died of pneumonia. One could say it was his poetry, more than 
anything, more even than his frail body, which brought him the epithet of a moribund. 
This is not so much because his poetry talked directly about death, however; but 
because it portrayed life as a form of death. In this sense, dos Anjos could very well be 
compared to Hölderlin,  although while  the latter  would spell  out the otherwise implicit 
coincidence of life and death in so many words as “Leben ist Tod, und Tod ist auch ein 
Leben” [life is death, and death is also a form of life] (Hölderlin, 1923, p. 27), dos Anjos 
would remain on the suggestive side, and bring this idea down to more veiled and indirect 
expression of contingency.
My goal in this essay is to talk of that contingency. I will attempt to demonstrate 
how dos Anjos’  Weltanchaaung implies a flight from the common conception of life as 
opposed to death. In order to do that, I will point to how his poetry verges on a perception  
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of reality that inverts the usual perspective where consciousness is taken for granted as 
existing  somewhat  separately from the world and regarding it  from an alleged vantage 
point. Instead of relying on the usual subjective approach to poetic expression, I will argue, 
dos Anjos brings poetic experience towards the viewpoint of pure being, leaning towards a 
perspective that instantiates the possibility of seeing life from the perspective of death, and 
from that of insinuating the poetic accessibility to a mind-independent reality. 
The vantage point of Being taken by do Anjos has caused a whole deal of confusion 
among  his  critics.  Alexei  Bueno,  for  instance,  perceives  the  poet’s  insistence  on  the 
concrete  aspects  of  existence  as  a  form of unrestricted  materialism.  He writes  that  dos 
Anjos is 
materialista,  acreditando  racionalmente  em  um  evolucionismo 
panteísta onde só a generalidade das formas universais progredia e 
sobrevivia, o poeta era obrigado a conscientemente se tomar por um 
efêmero, aleatório e ínfimo acidente genético na grande cadeia das 
espécies,  condenado  sem  apelação  à  desaparição  total  enquanto 
especificidade individual (BUENO, 1994, p. 25).
The adjective “materialist” could hardly do any justice to dos Anjos and his poetry, 
for in his worldview no materialism or spiritualism can be identified as concrete instances. 
A more rigorous approach to his work will reveal the expression of a total identity of life 
with  Being  that  takes  poetic  experience  to  a  realm  that  is  beyond  materialism  or 
spiritualism and which comes forth as pure contingency. Bueno is right when he mentions 
that dos Anjos took himself for an arbitrary genetic accident that was doomed to disappear 
as  an  individual  specificity.  Nevertheless,  such  disappearance  itself  holds  deeper 
philosophical implications of which Bueno seems not to be aware. 
Let’s begin with dos Anjos’ approach to pain. As Elbio Spencer suggests,
A  dor,  no  entender  de  Augusto,  era  a  maxima  motivação  à 
fraternidade universal, porquanto ela exercendo seu império sobre a 
natureza, todos por ela eram tocados e por ela deviam se irmanar. 
Disso se tinha prova na própria mecânica natural do transformismo 
molecular,  onde  os  seres  integram  o  todo  e  pelo  todo  são 
integrados. A dor é eterna, e como tal, integra a própria vida. Eis a 
idéia angular do poeta (SPENCER, 1967, p. 183).
As the whole integrates beings in a molecular transformation from which pain 
ensues, pain appears as ontologically grounded in a totality that is for the most part nature 
itself. And as no organic beings really escape nature, dos Anjos writes:
Há uma força vencida nesse mundo!
Todo o organismo florestal profundo
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É dor viva, trancada num disfarce… (DOS ANJOS, 1994, p. 201)
The notion that pain is inherent to the world and as such comprises an unavoidable 
element deeply entrenched in Being is here taken up by a poetic expression that perceives 
nature  as  the  source  and  material  of  reality’s  undeniable  absurdity.  The  ontological 
characteristic of pain, then, points to a realm prior to human life, where nature appears as a 
vanquished force that in all its vitality will never overcome the contradiction of being the 
very  source  of  its  own distress.  From a  broader  perspective,  we are  face  here  with  a 
cosmological vision that recognizes the contingency of Being as its inescapability from an 
outrageous misfortune that is not separable from itself. 
Dos Anjos’ recognition of the fundamental character of pain as inherent to all Being 
has a parallel in another Latin American poet. In Cosmogonía, Jorge Luis Borges takes the 
ontological grounds of pain to the foremost moment of the appearance of Being in a poetic 
rendering of the birth of the universe:
Ni tiniebla ni caos. La tiniebla 
requiere ojos que ven, como el sonido
y el silencio requieren el oído,
y el espejo, la forma que lo puebla.
Ni el espacio ni el tiempo. Ni siquiera
una divinidad que premedita
el silencio anterior a la primera 
noche del tiempo, que será infinita.
El gran río de Heráclito el Oscuro
su irrevocable curso no ha emprendido,
que del pasado fluye hacia el futuro,
que del olvido fluye hacia el olvido.
Algo que ya padece. Algo que implora. 
Después la historia universal. Ahora. (BORGES, 1998, p. 14)
While Borges proceeds to an archeological account of pain as something that is 
prior to history, and that as such lies beneath the vital movement of all and every being, dos 
Anjos will take an existential  view on this same element,  and look at human life as an 
expression of this universal pain that Borgers renders as an indeterminate substratum that 
already suffers and implores before even time has dawn. Here we are required to point to 
Schopenhauer’s influence in both dos Anjos and Borges. The fact that pain can never be 
completely expunged from Being points to something very similar to the irrationality of 
Schopenhauer’s  will  to  live.  But instead of relying  on Schopenhauer,  I  will  look for  a 
philosophical parallel to the expressions of dos Anjos and Borges in another instance where 
Being is perceive as inexorably linked to contingency.
In Sartre we find an instance where the same irrationality of Schopenhauer’s will to 
Cadernos do IL. Porto Alegre, n.º 43, dezembro de 2011. p. 345-353.
EISSN:2236-6385 http://www.seer.ufrgs.br/cadernosdoil/ 347
CADERNOS DO IL   ʘ   CADERNOS DO IL   ʘ   CADERNOS DO IL   ʘ   CADERNOS DO IL   ʘ   CADERNOS DO IL   ʘ   CADERNOS DO IL
live appears embedded in a discussion of the original moment of human life that can serve 
us well in our attempt to elucidate the identity of life and death as the major underlying 
theme of the poetry we have at hand. In section II of Being and Nothingness Sartre talks of 
the upsurge of consciousness, and of how that upsurge cannot be rationally accounted for. 
In his own words,
it is as the nihilation of the In-itself that the For-itself arises in the 
world,  and  it  is  by  this  absolute  event  that  the  Past  as  such  is 
constituted  by  this  original,  nihilating  relation  between  the  For-
itself and the In-itself. What originally constitutes the being of the 
For-itself  in  this  relation to  a  being which  is  not consciousness, 
which exists in the total night of identity, and which the For-itself is 
nevertheless  obliged  to  be,  outside  and  behind  itself  (SARTRE, 
1972, p. 138). 
As the for-itself is obliged to be, outside and behind itself, this very being which it  
attempts  to  negate,  and which  exists  in  the  “total  night  of  identity,”  we are  forced  to 
conclude that the for-itself carries in itself this obscure, irrational, and for the most part 
unreliable  sort  of  self-referential  nucleus  that  is  never  other  than  itself.  Sartre  here, 
however, seems to miss the question of what exactly comprises what he perceives as the 
self-identity of the in-itself. If we agree with the aforementioned interpretation of Borge’s 
poetic suggestion of the inseparability of Being and pain, then we must qualify Sartre’s 
assertions to a view that accommodates distress as ontologically formative of the in-itself. 
We are in need of a further phenomenological reduction to Sartre’s perception of 
the self-identity of the in-itself. If such obscure dimension of Being is identical with itself, 
and pain comprises its very ontological substratum, than the identity of such being must 
reside in its identity with pain itself. Our question here is how can the in-itself be identical 
with itself if pain is to be considered as part of it. 
A thorough self-identity,  understood as the concrete and unchanging state of that 
which is  as it  is,  would have to imply a coherent  and reliable  form of stability.  While 
instability necessarily implies  potentiality,  self-identity  cannot  be the characteristic  of a 
being that is capable of changing. As such, the notion of in-itself’s self-identity must be 
rejected to accommodate its very possibility of becoming the for-itself. Such possibility, 
while entrenched in the in-itself’s ontological constitution as pain, must issue from pain 
itself. In other words, while pain implies separation, for in order to be experienced such 
pain  must  be  an  entity  existing  outside  of  that  which  experiences  it,  the  pain  that  is 
ontologically grounded in the in-itself points to a movement that precludes the in-itself’s 
very self-identity. For pain comes not from stability: on the contrary, pain is movement and 
instability.
Sartre’s avowal of the flight of the for-itself towards the self-identity of the in-itself 
must then be reversed to that of the flight of the in-itself towards its own contradiction.  
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From such flight, the for-itself ensues. And, more importantly, such flight must be a flight 
from pain. As a flight from pain, the transformation of the in-itself in for-itself must be 
understood as a flight from instability, movement and contingency.
This initial contingency of Being must then be perceived as the very motive of the 
upsurge of consciousness and of human-life in general. What I will attempt to demonstrate 
in the next few pages, is that instead of a blunt materialism, the poetic rendering of this 
very contingency of Being and of its flight towards its own contradiction is what lies at 
heart of Augusto dos Anjos’ poetry. 
The  absurdity  of  being’s  ontological  groundedness  in  pain  is  suggested  by  dos 
Anjos through the expression of the most basic aspects of organic matter in its movement 
and contradiction. In “A um germem” the author proceeds to a poetic rendering of Being 
that brings forth contradiction as the core of all experience:
Começaste a existir, geléia crua,
E hás de crescer, no teu silêncio, tanto
Que, é de natural, ainda algum dia, o pranto
Das tuas concreções plásmicas flua!
A água em conjugação com a terra nua,
Vence o granito, deprimido-o… O espanto
Convulsiona os espíritos, e, entanto,
Teu desenvolvimento continua! (DOS ANJOS, 1994, p. 201)
Growth and tears (“crescer” and “pranto”) appear as the inherent condition of this 
plasmic matter’s movement that can be equated with life itself. The absurd resides in the 
fact that pain never leaves this continual development that goes on indefinitely. Convulsion 
and  bewilderment  appear  as  the  natural  result  of  spirit  as  it  is  confronted  with  the 
contingency in which it is grounded. Dos Anjos continues:
Antes, geléia humana, não progridas
E em retrogradações indefinidas,
Volvas à antiga inexistência calma!...
Antes o Nada, oh! Gérmen, que ainda haveres
De atingir, como germen de outros seres,
Ao supreme infortúnio de ser alma! (DOS ANJOS, 1994, p. 202)
Here nothingness appears as the final aim and desired condition of organic matter in 
its absurd and random development. Dos Anjos openly demands of Being the stop of its 
movement  in  order  to  arrive  at  a  total  rest  that  he  understands  cannot  be  other  than 
nothingness  itself.  If  non-existence  can  be  the  only  solution  to  pain,  nothingness,  as 
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negation, appears both as the very expression of that denial and as the closest condition 
possible to the achievement of non-being. 
Dos Anjos continual recurrence to scientific vocabulary hides then the approach to a 
deeper truth of being that is defined as organic matter in search for stability outside of 
itself.  Negation  then  becomes  the  defining  mode of  human reality,  and the upsurge of 
consciousness of which Sartre speaks in section II of Being and Nothingness appears as the 
very  expression  and  result  of  that  negation.  While  human  existence  is  the  ultimate 
expression of Being’s search for stability,  dos Anjos’ alleged cientificism comprises the 
vision of an existential search grounded in the contingency of Being. 
If the in-itself is pain because it is in constant flux, and if from the very attempt of 
putting  an  end  to  that  flux  the  for-itself,  or  consciousness,  ensues,  individuality,  as  a 
dimension that is posterior to and grounded in the pure reflexivity of consciousness, can be 
regarded  as  equally  determined  by  the  universal  contingency  of  Being/pain.  The 
achievement of dos Anjos’ poetry consists, thus, in accounting for the individual self as 
nothing more than a moment of that larger movement of Being. As negation issues from the 
very Being that is negated (for we consider human reality as belonging to the totality of 
Being), the “night of identity”  from which the for-itself  ensues appears as an important 
dimension of the individual self that can never be totally transcended. Dos Anjos, then, 
proceeds to rendering this basic axiomatic truth through a poetic effort that results in the 
expression of the destruction of the individual self. It is in this sense that in “Psicologia de 
um  vencido”  we  perceive  the  human  subject  reduced  to  little  more  than  its  basic 
inherentedness to universal contingency:
Eu, filho do carbono e do amoníaco,
Monstro de escuridão e rutilância,
Sofro, desde a epigênese da infância,
A influência má dos signos do zodíaco.
Profundíssimamente hipocondríaco,
Este ambiente me causa repugnância...
Sobe-me à boca uma ânsia análoga à ânsia 
Que se escapa da boca de um cardíaco.
Já o verme – este operário das ruinas – 
Que o sangue podre das carnificinas
Come, e à vida em geral declara guerra,
Anda a espreitar meus olhos para roê-los
E há de deixar-me apenas os cabelos,
Na frialdade inorgânica da terra! (DOS ANJOS, 1994, p. 203). 
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Appearing in the sole volume published by the author during his lifetime called Eu, 
this poem is part of a larger inquiry on the untenability of the self. The very title of dos  
Anjos’s book denote the search for an “I” that is hardly discernible from the totality of 
Being’s plight in an existence determined by pain and unfulfillment. Here I will point to 
fact  that  the  self  is  being  denied  the  dignified  existence  it  might  have  achieved  in  an 
otherwise simply materialistic world-view. Monstrosity,  abjection and the images of the 
body in the state of putrefaction bring dos Anjos’ poetic expression to a critique of the self 
that goes beyond the mere identification of the material nature of existence.
Monstrosity appears in the poem’s second line as an adjectivation of the “I” that is 
brought forth through the first word of the piece. The aesthetic category of the grotesque 
sets itself in the poem as the function of an undesirable existence. The self is thus regarded 
as lack and deformity, and its presence is hardly discernible from that of a purely biological 
instance that is prone to decay. Abjection appears as a primordial sense of undesirability 
(Kristeva 81) in face of the inability of the self to come into existence completely: captured 
in the sheer contingency of biological upheaval, dos Anjos’s “I” is virtually absent from the 
poem as an entity that would be capable of taking the reins of its own destiny. 
The scientific vocabulary of dos Anjos emphasizes the grotesque in a naturalistic 
manner (Bruflat 780). Such naturalism discloses putrefaction as a recurrent theme of the 
self’s captivity to the body as such. Thus, the self is translated into an entity that is form the 
most part untenable: the “I” of dos Anjos, while reduced to pure body, is portrayed as an 
insignificant moment in the malstrom of pure contingency. 
The ontological nature of pain then plays the role of determining what being is, that 
is, the house of contigency’s eternal attempt to surmount itself. As pain, as Being, makes 
Being want to depart from itself, the illusion of a secure place appears as love when beings 
are disclosed as moments of that eternal attempt. Love and pain thus are complementary as 
love is identified as the effort to achieve the unity that is precluded to beings from their 
ground in disunity and dispersion. 
Sartre talks of love as the desire of the for-itself to take hold of the self-identity, 
construed as the body (flesh), of the other. The other would then be the threshold to the 
unity that is denied the for-itself because of its separation from itself. Here we would have 
to, again, qualify Sartre’s assertions concerning love so that they could be accommodated 
to the perception of the contingency and instability of the in-itself as pain. 
According this view, love would be less the attempt of the for-itself to achieve the 
concreteness of the other’s flesh than its desire to achieve the stability and cessation of 
contingency and pain present in the other’s nothingness (that is, the negation of itself). The 
aim of love appears thus as the taking hold of the other’s freedom in a deeper sense than 
that  acknowledged  by  Sartre.  The  other’s  consciousness,  that  is,  its  ultimate  realm  of 
freedom, is what the lover attempts to bring under his or her control. Sartre is right when he 
recognizes  the  attempt  to  operate  on  the  other’s  freedom  as  the  final  goal  of  love. 
Nevertheless  he  comes  short  in  perceiving  that  such  attempt  results  from a  desire  for 
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nothingness, instead of issuing from what he avows as the alluring manifestation of self-
identity in the other’s flesh. 
The flight from eternal pain is thus translated as love. As such flight is doomed to 
failure (for nothingness as such is unattainable) love appears as a useless enterprise that 
cannot but result in conflict. Aware of this reality, dos Anjos writes em “Estrofes sentidas,”
Eu sei que o amor enche o Universo todo
E se prende dos poetas à guitarra
Como o polipo que se agarra ao lodo
E a ostra que às rochas eternais se agarra.
O amor reduz-nos a uniformes placas,
Uniformiza todos os anelos
E une organizações fortes e fracas
Nos mesmos laços e nos mesmos elos. (DOS ANJOS, 1994 p. 475)
Here dos Anjos’ poem portrays desire for unity as the fulcrum of love. Self-identity, 
understood now as the final and complete merging with the other, is intuited as pertaining 
to a larger, universal movement (a movement that “fills the whole Universe”). Thwarted by 
the absolute impossibility of achieving  such unity that lies outside of being, however, the 
poet recognizes the ultimate meaninglessness of love:
Todo o ser que no mundo turbilhona
Veja no Amor, à luz das minhas frases, 
Uma montanha que se desmorona,
Estremecendo em suas próprias bases (ibid., p. 475).
Here nature and love bring forth again the organic character of Being’s search for its 
own  contradiction.  Pain  is  also  called  into  play  to  integrate  the  tripartite  unity  of 
nature/love/distress:
Dos meus sonhos o exército desfila
E, à frente dele, eu vou cantando a nênia
Do amor que eu tive e que se fez argila,
Como Tirteu na guerrra de Messênia!
Transponho assim toda a sombria escarpa
Sinistro, como quem medita um crime…
E quando a Dor me dói, tanjo minha harpa
E a harpa saudosa a minha Dor exprime! (DOS ANJOS, 1994, p. 476).
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The poet  sings his  pain as his  love becomes petrified.  However,  the capitalized 
“Dor” points to a sort of pain that is larger than any soreness momentarily experienced by 
the individual. We are faced with an inescapable feeling that in spite of manifesting itself in 
individual instances belongs to the deeper structural layers of Being, and as such is never 
completely passive of being transcended. 
Pain brings nothingness into the world. And as nothingness belongs primarily to the 
domain of the human, the female figure, in its unattainability, becomes the instantiation of 
Being’s failure to achieve the stability that lies in its own contradiction:
Nas frias antecâmaras do Nada
O fantasma da fêmea castigada,
Passa agora ao clarão da lua acesa
E é seu corpo expiatório, alvo e desnudo,
A síntese eucarística de tudo 
Que não se realizou na Natureza! (DOS ANJOS, 1994, p. 319)
Somewhere very close to nothingness,  but without  ever entering its  domain,  the 
woman  synthesizes  all  that  is  not  realized  in  nature,  namely,  the  encounter  with  the 
negative realm of pure cessation and tranquility. The disclosure of the plight inherent to the 
search for nothingness as the ultimate reality of Being is what characterizes dos Anjos’ 
poetry as pertaining to a heightened awareness of Being. Such awareness takes the stand 
point where Being is prior to mind, and where reality is taken for existing independent of a 
human witness that can account for it. 
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